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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WHITNEY D. HA'MMOND, 
Administrator of the Estate of 
Jim Eskridge, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ZELPH S. CALDER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8827 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
For brevity, defendant and appellant will here-
inafter be referred to as Calder and plaintiff and 
respondent will be called Hammond or Eskridge. 
Hammond's brief recites many facts that can-
not be substantiated by the record. To recite each 
and every instance would make this reply brief too 
long. However, at the bottom of Hammond's brief 
page 2 he says that "on numerous occasions appel-
lant (Calder) permitted his livestock to go upon 
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the land farmed by the plaintiff without permission, 
causing considerable damage to the crops growing 
thereon.'' This is erroneous, and apparently designed 
for the purpose to bolster up Eskridge's unfounded 
su:It. 
Calder's livestock was never upon the leased 
ground of Eskridge while grain was growing there-
on. 
Eskridge's foreman insisted that Calder keep 
his cattle off the leased ground entirely even though 
the grain was harvested. This was in direct contra-
vention of the terms of the lease granting Calder 
all the grazing. 
Hammond attempts to show at the bottom of 
page 3 of his brief that he was appointed as an 
ancillary administrator of the estate of Jim Esk-
ridge, a non-resident and hence was not required 
to file a non-residence cost bond. This is erroneous. 
I:t will be noted that the widow of Jim Eskridge 
filed a p~tition requesting that Whitney D. Ham-
mond be appointed as administrator for the pur-
pose only to further prosecute the case alre'ady filed 
by her late husband, specifically alleging that the 
estate had no other property in Utah. (R. 84) Thus 
Whitney D. Hammond had authority only to act 
as agent, trustee, or special administrator to fur-
ther the case already instituted. 
With respeCt to Calder's Point 1, plaintiff's 
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failure to file a non-residence bond, the essential 
facts are undisputed, that is: The trial court gave 
Hammond 'an extension of time on November 15 to 
file a non-residence cost bond. No such bond was 
filed within the thirty days prescribed by the sta-
tutes. On December 17, Calder filed a Motion to 
Dismiss. This case, as a matter of law, should have 
ended here. No cost hond was ever filed. 
Hammond seeks 'to excuse out of filing a cost 
bond because he was a residence of Utah, growing 
out of the fact that he was an ancillary administra-
tor. 'This is not a case where the state becomes inter-
ested in unclaimed property of a non-resident re-
quiring the appointment of an ancillary adminis-
trator. (See 2 Words and Phrases Permanent Edi-
tion 702). 
If this court feels not to hold Calder on his 
Point 1, then the stipulation entered into on June 
26, 1956, set out in full, becomes an important 
instrument for this court to examine. 
The first question to be asked with respect to 
Calder's Point 2 is whether or not that stipulation 
makes provision for Calder to pay Eskridge's excess 
wheat penalty which was imposed by the United 
States Department of Agriculture about five months 
later. 
Hammond again goes outside the record a't 
page 11 and 12 of his brief and attempts to show 
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through lengthy conferences, (which did not occur), 
'that Calder was blameworthy for the penalty being 
imposed on the Eskridge wheat, because he harvested 
some of Eskridge's volunteer wheat that was turned 
to him on June 25. 
Apparently Hammond is not familiar with the 
U. S. D. A. 1956 Wheat Marketing Regulations (a 
copy is herewith left with the record for the con-
venience of the court and counsel.) 
Without considering the volunteer wheat acre-
age, there was planted about 100 acres in excess 
of the wheat allotment of 436 acres, which was 
mostly Eskridge's. 
Hammond refused to cooperate with Calder 
and plow up his pro rata share of planted wheat 
to meet the acreage allotment. Hence he was the 
blameworthy one. 
Where the acreage is in excess, the production 
of the wheat must also be in excess of the normal 
yield as fixed by the U. S. D. A. for the Calder 
farm before a penalty can be imposed. This could 
ndt be determined until after the wheat was har-
vested. (See Sec. 72 P. 659, 1956 Wheat Marketing 
Quota Regulations.) 
A:t the time the stipulation was entered into 
an extreme drouth exhis'ted. All indications pointed 
to a wheat crop far less than the normal yield. How 
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could this penalty be discussed when it was not 
known until after harvest? 
With respect to Calder's third point, does this 
stipulation provide that Calder shall pay the cost 
of plowing and preparing the ground for planting? 
To follow the court's holding would unjus'tly enrich 
Hammond. According to the U. S. D. A. measure-
ment of the wheat after it was harvested, Eskridge 
received 4,082 bushels from 350 acres of land. This 
wheat was worth at that time in excess of $8,000.00. 
On this basis, Eskridge would receive about $16,-
000.00 for 658 acres. All he would have had to do 
would be to plant 'the grain and harvest i't, the cost 
of which would not exceed $1.00 per acre for plarrt-
ing and $3.50 per acre for harvesting. Calder would 
furnish the ground, pay the taxes, 'the in teres't on 
the mortgage indebtedness, plow and prepare the 
ground for seed; then, on top of that, pay Eskridge's 
penalty on his own excess wheat of $1,129.00. Then 
still further, give up his right to pasture the Esk-
ridge stubble ground after harvest, for only 1;4 of 
the wheat grown. Common share cropping leases 
in the vicinity of Vernal are V2 to 'the land owner 
·and Y2 'to the sharecropper. 
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CONCLUSION 
We submit as a matter of law this case shoulo 
have been dismissed because of Hammond's failurE 
to file a non-residence cost bond. That if this point 
is not affirmed then we submit that it was error 
for the tiral court to hold that the stipulation im-
posed Eskridge's excess wheat penalty of $1,129.00 
upon Calder; that it was error for the trial court 
to construe "clearing" in the stipulation as meaning 
plowing and preparing for seed bed; that it was 
error for the court to disimss Calder's claim for 
removal of his granery and that it was error for 
the trial court to impose costs against Calder. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ZELPH. S. CALDER 
In Person 
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I certify tha:t I mailed 2 copies of the foregoing 
reply brief to Attorney Sterling D. Colton at 65 
South Ma:in, Salt Lake City, Utah, on ------------------------
19 --------· 
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